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We explore the role of ﬁrms in insuring risk-averse workers. As a device that
allows workers to commit to the delivery of their output, the ﬁrm arises endoge-
nously as an alternative to the spot market if workers are suﬃc i e n t l yr i s ka v e r s e
and the ﬁrm can base incentive payments on good information. Competition,
however, may allow the spot market and explicit contracts to crowd out implicit
insurance provided by the ﬁrm, even though the latter yields higher welfare. We
explain why diﬀerent governance structures coexist in quite homogeneous indus-
tries.
1 Introduction
Why do ﬁrms exist? Since Coase (1937) posed this fundamental question, it has still
not fully been resolved. This paper views the ﬁrm as a device that enables risk averse
suppliers to commit output to a speciﬁc buyer prior to its production. The implied
relationshipspeciﬁc nature of output allows insurance but harms incentives by creating
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a hold up problem. By facilitating insurance of risk averse suppliers, ﬁrms may create
value depending on whether explicit and implicit contracts can alleviate the associated
incentive problems. We explore when ﬁrms endogenously arise as an alternative to the
spot market in which suppliers transfer property rights to a speciﬁc buyer only after the
output has been produced.
We emphasize the relationshipspeciﬁc nature of output produced within a ﬁrm. In
this connection, one can distinguish three alternative cases for the appropriability of
output. First, output may be relationshipspeciﬁc: prior to its production, output is
committed to one speciﬁc buyer. Services like hair cutting and house cleaning are
typical examples in which output is necessarily relationshipspeciﬁc by the technological
nature of the production process. Second, suppliers may retain property rights over the
output during the production process so that it can be sold to any buyer after it has
been produced. We therefore refer to this appropriation mode as the ”spot market.” We
will show that the implied non-relationshipspeciﬁc nature of output rules out insurance
of risk-averse suppliers by a speciﬁc buyer. When output happens to be high due to a
favorable state of nature, the supplier sells the output on the spot market rather than
delivering it to the insurer (i.e. the buyer). Accordingly, the insurer obtains the output
only in bad states of nature and is thus not willing to oﬀer an insurance contract.
We focus on a third case in which the supplier can choose whether output is re-
lationshipspeciﬁc (so that output is committed to one speciﬁc buyer when production
o c c u r s )o rn o t( s ot h a to u t p u ti sn o tc o m m i t t e dt oas p e c i ﬁc buyer so that the producer
can sell the output to any buyer after it has been produced). Rather than imposed
by the technological nature of the production process, the relationshipspeciﬁcn a t u r eo f
output thus becomes an endogenous response to incentive problems. We call the institu-
tional arrangement that makes output relationshipspeciﬁca” ﬁrm.” The ﬁrm eﬀectively
transfers the property rights of the output to the buyer before the output is actually
produced. On the one hand, the transfer of property rights implies that the buyer faces
an agency problem in encouraging the supplier to provide eﬀort. It also exposes the
supplier to the temptation of the buyer to renege on the promise to provide incentive
payments; the supplier may be held up. On the other hand, ex ante transferring the
property rights of output to the buyer opens up scope for insurance by taking away the
temptation of the supplier not to deliver the output in case of a good state of nature.
Whether the supplier ﬁnds it optimal to expose herself to being held up within a ﬁrm
depends on the value of insurance versus the cost of addressing agency and hold-up
problems.3
In traditional shirking models with risk-neutral agents, a ﬁrm is an exogenous inven-
tion that harms eﬃciency by creating a temptation for the ﬁrm to hold up risk-neutral
workers. If a supplier would retain property rights over the output during the produc-
tion process so that it could be sold to any buyer, the threat of selling the output on
the spot market would induce the buyer to pay for the output. In this way, competi-
tion would eliminate the hold-up problem. Indeed, the contracting problems analyzed
in shirking models (see e.g. Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) and MacLeod and Malcomson
(1989)) originate in the assumed relationshipspeciﬁc nature of output. In our model with
risk-averse agents, in contrast, a ﬁrm is an endogenous innovation that allows agents to
insure themselves by providing a commitment to deliver the output to a speciﬁc buyer,
see Marglin (1970). In particular, a ﬁrm allows the employer to appropriate output,
thereby in eﬀect enforcing his property rights over the output. By building a factory
hall and storing output in this hall, for example, the employer can prevent workers from
stealing the output and selling it on the market. The institutional innovation of a ﬁrm
facilitates production if suppliers feature such a strong aversion against production risk
that they would refrain from producing for the risky spot market.
Another feature of the ﬁrm we emphasize is the implicit nature of the contracts that
are used to address the agency and hold-up problems caused by the relationshipspeciﬁc
nature of output. In this connection, we depart from the standard principal-agent model
(Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1987, 1991), which assumes that output is veriﬁable while
eﬀort cannot be observed. The latter model has a hard time explaining why low pow-
ered incentive schemes rather than explicit piece rate contracts are typically observed
in employment relationships. By allowing for only non-veriﬁable information on output
and some, albeit imperfect, information on eﬀort, we explain the observed prominence
of ﬁxed remuneration contracts, a phenomenon that is not easily explained within the
standard principal agent framework. This suggests that lack of veriﬁable information
rather than non-observability of eﬀort is a major problem in employment relationships.
Indeed, employers typically employ non-veriﬁable information to subjectively evaluate
the eﬀort level of their workers while the most important mutual obligations in em-
ployment relationships can not be enforced in court. We also show that only lack of
veriﬁable information can explain self employment and the boundaries of the ﬁrm.
By focussing on the role of non veriﬁable information, we extend the literature on
self-enforcing contracts in shirking models. In particular, we introduce the insurance
motive in implicit contracts, thereby exploring the feasibility of self-enforcing insurance
contracts. Insurance contracts are viewed as repeated prisoners’ dilemmas, where the4
prospect of future surpluses makes the contracts self-enforcing. We focus on the equi-
librium in which the supplier provides eﬀort ﬁrst and the buyer subsequently meets the
non-veriﬁable obligation to reward the worker for the eﬀort.1 Accordingly, incentives
are costly because they require the supplier to concede part of the surplus to the ﬁrm
so that the ﬁrm has an interest in rewarding the worker after the worker has provided
the eﬀort. Intuitively, the ﬁrm levies a charge on the supplier to oﬀset the temptation
to renege on the implicit contract. This charge distorts resource allocation by crowding
out welfare-enhancing trade. Relationships that yield only marginal rents cannot be
sustained because self-enforcing cooperation requires non-marginal rents from the rela-
tionship to keep honest the party who is tempted to renege on non-veriﬁable obligations.
By viewing the ﬁrm as an institution that allows workers to ex ante transfer the
property rights over their output, we ﬁnd conditions under which the ﬁrm endogenously
arises as an alternative to the market. In particular, a ﬁrm survives competition with
t h es p o tm a r k e ti fw o r k e r sa r es u ﬃciently risk averse while the ﬁrm bases its incentive
payments on good information containing contracting costs. We thus reverse the Coasian
perspective on the ﬁrm according to which the ﬁrm dominates the market if the market
suﬀers from substantial transaction cost. Instead, the ﬁrm is competitive if the price
charged by the ﬁrm to make the insurance contract self-enforcing is smaller than the
insurance premium risk-averse workers are willing to pay. Only then do workers choose
to transfer the property rights over the fruits of their labor before production actually
occurs. In this connection, we demonstrate that non-veriﬁable information explains why
the spot market can be more competitive than the ﬁrm so that self employment may
survive competition from contractual employment within a ﬁrm. The reversal of the
Coasian perspective is also consistent with the empirical evidence by Allen and Lueck
(1999) that riskier output does result in a more widespread application of cropsharing
contracts, as predicted by the standard principal agent model. Allen and Lueck suggest
that this may be due to riskier output providing more scope for cheating on contractual
obligations. Hence, greater riskiness might proxy for less veriﬁable information.
The composition of the worker’s pay oﬀ i sd i s c o n t i n u o u sa tt h ep o i n ta tw h i c ht h e
worker is indiﬀerent between the spot market and the ﬁrm. In particular, if the worker
becomes marginally less risk averse or the quality of the non-veriﬁable information on
eﬀort worsens somewhat, the spot market crowds out the ﬁr m . A nu p w a r dj u m pi n
the expected monetary pay-oﬀ of the worker oﬀsets the additional risk assumed by the
1This is in fact the vacancy equilibrium analyzed by MacLeod and Malcomson (1989) rather than
the unemployment equilibrium explored by Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984).5
worker. We can thus explain discrete regime switches in governance structures as a
result of marginal changes in parameters. Accordingly, diﬀerent governance structures
may coexist in a single industry if such an industry operates around the point at which
the ﬁrm is about as competitive as the spot market (see Krueger (1991)).
Our welfare analysis shows that competition may allow the spot market to break up
the ﬁrm, even though the ﬁrm yields higher overall welfare. Intuitively, in competing
for workers, ﬁrms do not take into account that they reduce the rents of other ﬁrms. As
a result of this business stealing eﬀect, competition destroys ﬁrms, thereby eliminating
the rents from insurance. As the market crowds out bilateral relationships that enforce
implicit insurance contracts, competition thus results in an excessively low level of in-
surance. Hence, contrary to the popular judgement that market competition resulting
in vertical disintegration is beneﬁcial, competition crowding out implicit contracts en-
forced by the ﬁrm may well harm eﬃciency by reducing the value that ﬁrms create by
enforcing these implicit contracts. In line with common wisdom, spot market relation-
ships do provide better incentives for eﬀort, but they do so at the cost of a lower level
of valuable insurance.
The mechanism described here resembles the concern expressed by Shleifer and Sum-
mers (1988) about competition in the market for corporate control crowding out valuable
implicit contracts. Also they maintain that competition threatens the commitment to
implicit contracts, thereby potentially threatening the value that ﬁrms create by en-
forcing implicit contracts. Whereas Shleifer and Summers focus on the crowding out of
quasi rents compensating relationshipspeciﬁc investments, we emphasize the reduction
of rents that induce ﬁrms to comply with implicit insurance contracts with their workers.
Through both these mechanisms, valuable implicit contracts are destroyed.
Although we cast our analysis in the context of employment relations between work-
ers and ﬁrms, our main message has wider applicability. Former civil servants, who
left their government job and are now hired by the same government on the basis of
spot market relations, have given up insurance in favor of stronger incentives and higher
expected pay. The tax payer is worse oﬀ, since the expected pay in the market exceeds
the wage of the civil servant by more than the value of the additional eﬀort extracted.
Similar mechanisms are at work in the transition from deﬁned beneﬁtt od e ﬁned con-
tribution pension systems. Through deﬁned beneﬁtp e n s i o n s ,ﬁrms typically provide
workers with substantial insurance of macro-economic risks, such as the rate of return
on savings. These insurance systems are more and more crowded out by competition
from deﬁned-contribution schemes.6
Similar to the value of competition between the spot market and the ﬁrm, the in-
troduction of explicit contracting by making information veriﬁable is a mixed blessing.
On the one hand, explicit contracts may result in more trade, thereby increasing rents
of marginal ﬁrms. On the other hand, by crowding out non-marginal implicit contracts,
explicit contracts destroy rents enjoyed by non-marginal ﬁrms who oﬀer implicit insur-
ance contracts. This latter eﬀect can explain the complaints about the juridiﬁcation of
contracts, that is explicit contracts enforced by the courts crowding out self-enforcing,
implicit contracts based on long-term relationships. More generally, we show that so-
ciety may overinvest in additional information if the existing information is already of
reasonable quality. Intuitively, the main eﬀect of additional information in these cir-
cumstances is to redistribute rents towards those investing in the information, thereby
harming other traders. If initial information is poor, in contrast, agents may underin-
vest in information because additional information in that case creates additional trade,
thereby also beneﬁting potential trading partners.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. After section 2 discusses the model,
section 3 considers the case in which suppliers output is relationshipspeciﬁcs ot h a t
output is committed to a speciﬁc buyer when it is being produced. Depending on the
quality of the available information, it explores the contracts that can be used to address
the agency and hold-up problems associated with this commitment. This section oﬀers
a integrative framework of which both the standard principal agent model of Holmstrom
and Milgrom (1987) and the shirking model of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) are special
cases. Subsequently, section 4 turns to the case in which suppliers cannot commit output
t oas p e c i ﬁc buyer and shows that this rules out insurance. Section 5 considers the case
in which the supplier has the option of committing output to a speciﬁc buyer. It analyses
the conditions under which suppliers choose to commit output prior to is production
so that the ﬁrm endogenously arises as an alternative to the spot market. Section 6
introduces the supplier’s outside option of choosing leisure so that the supplier faces
three alternatives: production with commitment, production without commitment, and
no trade. It also investigates the welfare implications of competition between these three
alternatives. Section 7 concludes.
2 The model
Consider an economy populated by a ﬁxed, large number of two types of inﬁnitely lived
players, namely risk-averse suppliers and risk-neutral buyers. Suppliers exert eﬀort in7
order to produce output that is consumed by buyers. Transactions between buyers
and suppliers occur only at ﬁxed time intervals– the so-called transaction period. All
deliveries of output and all payments occur at the end of this transaction period. With-
out loss of generality, we normalize the time length of the transaction period to unity.
Output in transaction period t, xt,s a t i s ﬁes
xt = et + zt,
where et denotes the level of eﬀort chosen by the supplier in transaction period t. zt
represents a normally distributed random variable, which measures shocks on output.
We normalize E[zt]=0a n d 2 Var[zt] = 1 without loss of generality.3 The pay-oﬀso f
suppliers and buyers, ri
t, i = s,d, are given by
r
s








t = xt − yt, (2)
where yt denotes the money buyers transfer to suppliers in exchange for output. The
quadratic speciﬁcation of eﬀort cost for the suppliers implies that supply is less than
inﬁnitely elastic, with the elasticity of eﬀort depending on the parameter ε. Demand, in
contrast, is inﬁnitely elastic due to the linear form of the pay oﬀ. A buyer may trade
with several suppliers simultaneously. However, with perfectly elastic demand, a buyer’s
trade with one particular supplier does not aﬀect the buyer’s valuation of trade with
other suppliers.
Suppliers exhibit constant absolute risk aversion. Their expected lifetime utility us










where θ,0 ≤ θ ≤ ε stands for the coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion and δ > 0r e p -
resents the discount rate. For notational convenience, we deﬁne a transformed utility
criterium us = − δ
θε ln[−Us]. With a stationary, normal distribution of rs
t, this trans-



























2Throughout the paper, square brackets denote the arguments of functions while round and curly
brackets represent the ordering of arithmetic operations.
3T h ei m p l i c a t i o n so ft h em o d e lw o u l db eu n a ﬀected if one would change the standard deviation
inversely to the coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion θ (deﬁned below).8
w h e r ew eu s e de q u a t i o n( 1 )t oe l i m i n a t ers
t.
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E[et − yt]( 5 )
w h e r ew eu s e de q u a t i o n( 2 )t oe l i m i n a t erd
t and E[xt]= E [ et].
Each transaction period consist of three phases: a bargaining phase, a production
phase, and a transaction phase. During the bargaining phase, traders must make a
number of decisions. First, if a contract matched them to a speciﬁc trading partner
during the previous transaction period, they must decide whether they continue that
relationship. Second, if they are not matched with a trading partner, suppliers have
to decide whether they produce or collect their outside option during that transaction
period. If they produce, they can opt for either ﬁrst producing output and looking for
ab u y e ro nt h es p o tm a r k e to n l ya f t e r w a r d so rt h e yc a nﬁrst seek a trading partner, ne-
gotiate an (implicit or explicit) contract and only subsequently start production. These
steps during the bargaining phase are costless and do not take any time.
At the beginning of the production phase, the state of nature is revealed to the
producing suppliers. Next, these suppliers decide on their level of eﬀort. Finally, the
transaction phase occurs at the end of the production period. During this phase, sup-
pliers deliver the output to the buyers and buyers submit their payments to suppliers.
Also the events during the transaction phase are costless and do not take any time.
Time elapses thus only during the production phase.
We distinguish three modes of information for eﬀort and two information modes
for output. At one extreme, eﬀort can be veriﬁed by a third party so that eﬀort is
contractible. Veriﬁable information is denoted by v. At the other extreme, neither a
third party nor the buyer can observe eﬀort; no represents this case of non-observable
eﬀort. In the intermediate case, eﬀort cannot be veriﬁed by a third party but can be
observed by the buyer. This case of non-veriﬁable information is denoted by nv. Output
can be either veriﬁable or non-veriﬁable by a third party. Output is always observable
by both transaction partners. The supplier knows both his own level of eﬀort and
the state of nature zt and thus also the output level. The buyer is able to evaluate
the output when it is delivered at the end of the transaction period. Together, the
three information modes on eﬀort and two on output, yields six possible combinations,9
denoted for example by {e,x} =( v,nv) for the case where eﬀort is veriﬁable and output
is non-veriﬁable.
As discussed in the introduction, we distinguish three modes of appropriability of
output. The next three sections analyze each appropriation mode in turn. First, we
explore the case in which output is relationshipspeciﬁc: at the beginning of a transaction
period, a supplier has to commit the output to a speciﬁc buyer. We then turn to the case
in which output is non-relationship speciﬁc: a supplier cannot commit at the beginning of
a transaction period to which buyer to deliver her output. Subsequently, we investigate
t h ec a s ei nw h i c ht h es u p p l i e rc a nc h o o s ew h e t h e ro rn o tt oc o m m i tt h eo u t p u tt oa
speciﬁc buyer at the start of a transaction period.
3 Equilibrium with commitment
The section explores optimal insurance contracts if output is relationshipspeciﬁc. We
derive the optimal contract for each of the six conceivable information modes. Table
1 summarizes the outcome for each information mode. The subsequent subsections
provide a verbal discussion of the relevant contract for each mode. The proof of their
optimality is delegated to the appendix.4 We ﬁrst explore the two information modes
that do not involve non-veriﬁable information, that is {e,x} =( v,v),(no,v). These
purely explicit contracts serve as benchmarks for implicit contracts, which employ non-
veriﬁable information and are discussed in Section 3.2. Since contracts and equilibrium
strategies are stationary across transaction periods, we simplify notation by omitting
t h et i m es u b s c r i p tt.
3.1 Explicit contracts
3.1.1 Mode {e,x} =( v,v): full insurance
Competition between inﬁnitely elastic buyers implies that the equilibrium contract max-
imizes suppliers’ utility while buyers’ utility corresponds to that in the outside option,
ud = 0: suppliers switch to the buyer who oﬀers the contract that yields highest utility
to the suppliers. The risk-neutral buyer oﬀers the risk-averse supplier full insurance of
4For two information modes {e,x} =( nv,nv),(nv,v), we cannot prove optimality. Given a (trun-
cated) linear form of the contracts, we derive the optimal parameters associated with this particular
functional form. The presented incentive compatible contracts serve as lower bounds for the optimal
contracts.10
the production risk, conditional on the supplier exerting the eﬃcient level of eﬀort, ε.
This outcome is ﬁrst best for the supplier, conditional on the production technology and
the participation constraint of the buyer. In the sequel, we use the ﬁrst-best level of
eﬀort to normalize the degree of absolute risk aversion: 0 ≤ η ≡ θ/ε ≤ 1. Hence, η can
be interpreted as the degree of ”relative” risk aversion, namely absolute risk aversion
relative to the ﬁrst-best level of output.
3.1.2 Mode {e,x} =( no,v): explicit piece rate
Without any information on eﬀort, incentives must be based on output so that risk
is transferred to the risk-averse supplier, implying ineﬃcient risk sharing. The optimal
contract therefore trades oﬀ sharing risk and providing eﬃcient incentives. This contract,
which is linear and thus features a ﬁxed piece rate b,o ﬀers only partial insurance to
the supplier. With risk-averse suppliers, η > 0, incentives are not strong enough to
induce the supplier to select the ﬁrst-best level of eﬀort (i.e. b<1s ot h a te∗ < ε).
If suppliers are risk neutral (i.e. η = 0), the optimal contract can costlessly provide
ﬁrst-best incentives so that eﬀort and utility converge to the full insurance case.
3.2 Implicit contracts
We now turn to contracts employing non-veriﬁable information. In contrast to explicit
contracts, implicit or self-enforcing contracts can be based on non-veriﬁable informa-
tion. These contracts rely on a repeated game with trigger strategies to enforce the
cooperative equilibrium. In particular, if a player complies to the non-veriﬁable obliga-
tions contained in the implicit contract, the trading partner rewards this behavior by
continuing the relationship. If a player shirks on these obligations, however, the trading
partner punishes the shirker by terminating the relationship. MacLeod and Malcomson
(1989) show that (at least) two cooperative equilibria exist. In one equilibrium, buyers
ﬁrst pay and are thus exposed to the supplier shirking on the non-veriﬁable obligation
to provide eﬀort. Suppliers do not shirk only if they are rationed, for example because
they cannot instantaneously ﬁnd a new trading partner after being ﬁred. Shapiro and
Stiglitz (1984) focus on this ’unemployment’ equilibrium. In the other equilibrium, sup-
pliers ﬁrst deliver eﬀort and then must wait and see whether the buyer complies to the
non-veriﬁable obligation to pay. The buyer can credibly commit to comply only if he is
rationed so that he cannot ﬁnd another supplier if the current trading partner decides
to quit. In the context of the labor market, this equilibrium is known as the ’vacancy’11
equilibrium. We focus on this latter equilibrium.5 In order to save on notation and
without loss of generality, we abstract from exogenous turnover. Hence, a buyer who
looses a supplier by failing to comply to his non-veriﬁable obligations will never ﬁnd
another trading partner, so that his expected life time utility equals the instantaneous
pay oﬀ of an unmatched buyer ud
un =0 . 6
For this type of implicit contract to be self enforcing, two incentive compatibility
constraints must be satisﬁed — one for the supplier and one for the buyer. In deriving
these non-shirking conditions, we decompose the monetary transfer into a contractible
part and a non-enforceable part: y [x,e]=yc [x,e]+yn[x,e], where the contractible part
yc [x,e] can be contingent only on veriﬁable information. The non-shirking condition for
the supplier can be written as
N.s.c. I: take the money and run













where esh stands for the eﬀort level if the supplier is shirking and e∗ denotes the equi-
librium value of eﬀort. The buyer pays the non-veriﬁable bonus payment yn [.]o n l yi f
the supplier does not shirk on non-veriﬁable obligations. Since the supplier sets eﬀort
knowing the realization of z, the non-shirking condition must be satisﬁed for all val-
ues of z. Expression (6) states that the value of shirking should not exceed the value
of complying to the contractual obligations, since the supplier is not rationed and can
therefore not be punished for shirking by the buyer ending the relationship.7
We now turn to the non-shirking condition for the buyer. The buyer faces a trade-oﬀ
between the short-run gain of shirking on the obligation to pay yn [.] and the long-run
gain of holding on to the surplus from the relationship by complying to his non-veriﬁable
obligations. At the beginning of the transaction period, the buyer’s lifetime utility when
5This choice can be justiﬁed by assuming that suppliers feature substantially higher discount rates
than buyers do (see e.g. Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1994)). This assumption implies that, compared
to buyers, suppliers need a larger surplus to support the relationship.
6Exogenous turnover would merely complicate notation without generating new insights. Alterna-
tively, the absence of exogenous turnover can be justiﬁed by assuming that past behavior of buyers is
known to all potential suppliers, who participate in punishing shirking buyers by not engaging in future
trade. With this collective punishment in place, shirking on implicit agreements harms one’s future
trading opportunities, see Greif (1993) and Greif, Milgrom and Weingast (1994).
7This non-shirking condition would become non-linear if we would allow for risk aversion and ra-
tioning at the same side of the market. This is the main reason why we focus on the equilibrium in
which the risk-neutral buyer is rationed.12



























sh[e∗,z] denotes the life-time utility of the buyer when shirking, conditional on
the realization of the state of nature during the current transaction period, z. The ﬁrst
term at the right-hand side of (7) represents the net discounted value of the pay oﬀ
during the transaction period. The second term at the right-hand side of (7) reﬂects
what happens after the transaction period; the supplier punishes the buyer for shirking
by ending the relationship so that the shirking buyer receives the value of an unmatched
player. Since ud
un = 0, this latter term drops out.
The corresponding expected lifetime utility of non-shirking (i.e. meeting one’s non-





















n−sh denotes expected life-time utility of non-shirking.
The non-shirking condition ∀z : ud
sh [e∗,z] ≤ ud
n−sh[e∗,z] ensures that the non-
veriﬁable contractual obligations are self-enforcing. Taking expectations in equation
(8), we ﬁnd ud
n−sh = 1
εE[rd
n−sh[e∗,z]]. Substituting this result into (8) to eliminate ud
n−sh
and subsequently substituting the resulting expression and (7) into the non-shirking











where 0 ≤ χ ≡ δ
δ+1 ≤ 1. Substituting rd
sh = x−yc and rd
n−sh = x−yc −yn (see (2)) and
using E[x]= E [ e∗], we arrive at the non-shirking condition for the buyer:

















n is shorthand notation for yn [x,e∗]a n dw h e r ey∗
c is deﬁned analogously. The
beneﬁt from shirking (saving the equilibrium non-veriﬁable payment y∗
n on the left hand
side) must not exceed its cost (loosing the future rents of the relationship on the right-
hand side). The non-shirking condition should hold for all possible values of this non-
veriﬁable payment, including the largest one maxz [y∗
n]. Condition (10) implies that the13
non-veriﬁable payment y∗
n cannot be positive if χ = 1: a buyer who reneges on the non-
veriﬁable obligation cannot be punished because the future punishment is discounted
away, δ →∞ .
The supplier does not obtain any rents from the relationship so that payments by
the supplier to the buyer cannot be self-enforcing. Hence, the non-veriﬁable payment
cannot be negative for any realization of z:
y
∗
n ≥ 0. (11)
This non-negativity constraint together with (10) implies that the participation con-
straint for the buyer ud ≥ 0 is met. The participation constraint of the buyer thus
does not need to be checked separately. Indeed, if the contract includes a non-veriﬁable
bonus, y∗
n > 0, the buyer enjoys a positive surplus. Even though buyers in the bargain-
ing stage are perfectly competitive, a competitive contract contingent on non-veriﬁable
information transfers some surplus to the buyer in order to induce the buyer to actually
transfer the non-veriﬁable payments to the supplier.
We are now in a position to derive the optimal contracts for the information modes
involving non-veriﬁable information.
3.2.1 Mode {e,x} =( nv,nv): ﬁxed remuneration contract
The implicit contract stipulates a level of eﬀort e∗ and a ﬁxed implicit bonus payment
y∗
n. Buyers pay this non-veriﬁable bonus since they do not want to loose the future
rents of the relationship, ud
n−sh = 1
2χ(1 − χ). Eﬀort is set below its ﬁrst best level
(i.e. e∗ =( 1− χ)ε < ε) because incentives require the supplier to concede part of the
surplus to the buyer in order to ensure that the buyer has an interest in complying to the
incentive payments. Just as in an explicit piece rate contract, therefore, incentives are
costly to suppliers. In an explicit piece rate, incentives requires ineﬃcient risk sharing
while in an implicit ﬁxed remuneration contract, credible incentives require a transfer
of part of the surplus to the buyer.
The ﬁxed remuneration contract resembles a standard employment contract: wages
are ﬁxed and unrelated to output, but employers require workers to maintain a certain
eﬀort level. Indeed, one of the major puzzles in labor economics is why so many low
powered incentive compensation schemes are observed. The standard principal agent
model with contractible eﬀort can explain low powered incentives only if suppliers are
extremely risk averse (η → 1). The non-veriﬁability of output and eﬀort provides a
simple explanation for the prominence of low powered incentive schemes without having14
to rely on extremely risk-averse workers. Since ﬁxed remuneration is a more common
transaction mode for employment relationships than explicit piece rate contracts, the
lack of veriﬁability of output seems to be the major problem in employment relationships.
The standard principal agent model appears to be too pessimistic about the observability
of eﬀort but overly optimistic about the veriﬁability of output.
3.2.2 Mode {e,x} =( no,nv): implicit piece rate ipr
This mode yields the most complicated contract. In order to avoid both negative and
large positive non-veriﬁable payments, we consider an implicit contract with a truncated
linear relationship between output x and the non-veriﬁable payment yn,w i t hb o t ha
maximum and minimum for yn. The contractible payment yc is constant since neither
output nor eﬀort are veriﬁable. The provision of incentives for eﬀort requires the non-
contractible bonus yn to depend on x.H e n c e , yn is stochastic. However, yn cannot
depend linearly on x for two reasons. First, yn < 0 cannot be supported in an equilibrium
in which suppliers are not rationed (see (11)). Second, yn c a n n o tb et o ol a r g eb e c a u s ea
large non-veriﬁable bonus is credible only if suppliers transfer a large surplus to buyers
(see (10)), which is contradictory to the interest of the supplier.
Consider a supplier who decides on eﬀort e, taking as given a truncated linear con-
tract and knowing the state of nature z.8 Figure 1 shows the situation graphically. z
is on the horizontal axis while the upper panel shows eﬀort e and the lower panel the
non-veriﬁable payment yn.I fz ∈ [z0,z+], the decision of the supplier is unaﬀected by
the non-linearities in the contract. Just as in a regular linear explicit piece rate contract,
therefore, the optimal eﬀort level amounts to e∗ = bε, where b denotes the piece rate. If
z<z 0, yn is less then the cost of eﬀort 1
2εe2 when obeying to the linear rule e = bε.I n
these unfavorable states of nature, therefore, the supplier faces no incentives to provide
any eﬀort, and hence e∗ =0 .I fz ∈ (z+,zˆ), the supplier gets the maximum value of yn,
even if he supplies less eﬀort than implied by the linear rule e = bε. Since additional
eﬀort does not yield a higher payment, the supplier sets 0 <e ∗ <b ε. In favorable states
of nature z ≥ zˆ, the non-veriﬁable bonus hits its ceiling even if no eﬀort is provided so
8Some commentators wondered whether the model would not be simpliﬁed by assuming that sup-
pliers set e not knowing z. This suggestion invokes two remarks. First, though e were non-stochastic
in that case, yn would still be non-linear, for the same reasons as discussed in the text, leading to a
model of comparable complexity. Second, the assumption that suppliers do not know z when setting
e would imply that a non-linear contract involving extreme punishments for low levels of output could
approximate the ﬁrst best in {e,x} =( no,v) (see Mirrlees (1976) and Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987)).15
that e∗ =0 .
Since the expressions for the contract’s parameters are rather complicated in the
general case, we focus on the special case ε →∞ , holding η constant (hence θ ≡ ηε →
∞). By ε →∞ , optimal expected output increases as the marginal cost of eﬀort falls
while the variability of the state of nature remains the same. Relative to the expected
level of output, therefore, the variability of the non-veriﬁable payment drops to zero. The
utility cost of risk compared to the expected value of output, in contrast, is unaﬀected by
the drop in relative riskiness because the coeﬃcient of ”relative” risk aversion η remains
unaﬀected by the simultaneous increase θ and ε.
In this limiting case ε →∞ , the optimal contract becomes linear. The intuition for
this result is as follows. As all contracts based on non-veriﬁable information, the optimal
contract must strike a balance between providing suﬃcient incentives and containing
the surplus that must be conceded to the buyer. On the one hand, the non-veriﬁable
payment must be large enough to compensate for the cost of eﬀort in order to satisfy the
suppliers’ non-shirking condition (6). On the other hand, in order to meet the buyer’s
non-shirking condition (10), the payment cannot be too large for that would require a
large share of the surplus to conceded to the buyer. When the non-veriﬁable payment is
stochastic, both conditions are more diﬃcult to satisfy simultaneously, since they have
to apply for both extremes, the ”worst” case z = z0,w h e r eyn is just suﬃciently large to
compensate the supplier for the cost of eﬀort 1
2εe2, and for the ”best” case z = z+,w h e r e
the expected future surplus is just enough to let the buyer comply with the non-veriﬁable
obligation to pay yn. This limits the linear range of the contract [z0,z+]i nw h i c hf u l l
incentives can be provided. The larger this range becomes, the more rents have to
be conceded to the buyer. By increasing ε, however, the relative variability of output
decreases and hence the relative variability of yn. Hence, the optimal range [z0,z+]
increases so that more states of nature are covered by the linear part of the contract.
In the limit ε →∞ , non-linearities loose their importance altogether so that all states
of nature fall in the linear part of the contract. At the same time, the variability of yn
(as a ratio of expected output) converges to zero, so that only the expected value of yn
matters for the non-shirking condition.
An implicit piece rate contract combines two imperfections, namely a lack of in-
surance (since the contract is contingent on output rather than eﬀort) and a lack of
veriﬁability (so that part of the surplus has to be conceded to the buyer). From the
point of view of suppliers, incentives are thus costly for two reasons, namely, ﬁrst, the
risk imposed on risk-averse suppliers, and, second, the rents that must be transferred to16
buyers in order to enforce non-veriﬁable payments. Both these reasons dull incentives.
Indeed, the equilibrium contract with non-veriﬁable output and non-observable eﬀort
implies lower incentives and a lower equilibrium eﬀort level e∗ than in case output is
veriﬁable or eﬀort is observable.
3.2.3 Mode {e,x} =( nv,v): mixed piece rate
A mixed piece rate contract combines an explicit piece rate b on output and a ﬁxed
non-veriﬁable payment for exerting a particular level of eﬀort e∗. The explicit part of
the contract reduces the non-veriﬁable bonus in the implicit contract y∗
n that is required
to induce the supplier to supply a given amount of eﬀort e∗. When shirking, optimal
eﬀort esh amounts to bε, just as in a pure explicit piece rate contract. The non-veriﬁable
transfer should compensate the supplier for the cost of eﬀort 1
2εe∗2 net of the cost of
eﬀort when shirking 1
2εe2
sh = ε
2b2 and of the reward provided by the explicit contract for
the additional eﬀort b(e∗ −esh)=be∗ −εb2. The non-veriﬁable bonus thus ﬁlls the hole
left by the explicit contract; the less incentives are provided through the explicit piece
rate contract, the more incentives should be provided through the implicit contract.
The explicit part of the contract, the piece rate b, is important compared to the
ﬁxed implicit bonus payment yn, if the cost of the explicit part (assignment of risk to
the supplier) is small compared to that of the implicit part (the surplus transferred to
the buyer). In the context of the mixed piece rate, the explicit and implicit part of the
contract are thus substitutes; if the implicit part is costly, agents rely more heavily on
the explicit part to provide incentives.
The mixed piece rate contract oﬀers a better description of the contract faced by
salesmen than the standard principal agent model. A ﬁrm employing a salesman who
sells too few pieces has no incentive to comply to its non-veriﬁable obligations. Hence,
the salesman is punished not only by reducing the contractible piece rate reward but
also by losing non-veriﬁable payments, i.e. beneﬁts that he can reasonably expect when
providing suﬃcient eﬀort but which are not included in his legal labor contract.
3.2.4 Mode {e,x} =( v,nv): full insurance
The non-veriﬁability of x does not change anything compared to the mode {e,x} =( v,v)
because information on output does not play a role in the full insurance contract. Hence,
also the information mode {e,x} =( v,nv)y i e l d st h eﬁrst-best full insurance contract.17
3.3 The role of information content
We are now in a position to discuss Table 1 in greater detail. The ﬁrst and second
line contain the utility of, respectively, a supplier and a buyer engaging in trade. The
third line provides total welfare (deﬁned as the sum of the utilities of the supplier
and the buyer). The fourth line indicates the incentives for eﬀort provided by each
contract by presenting the eﬀort the contracts elicit. The ﬁfth line contains the piece
rate used for that purpose. Finally, the sixth line lists the expected non-veriﬁable
payment. As a consequence of the buyers’ non-shirking condition (10), this payment is
directly proportional to the surplus reaped by the buyers (i.e. the second line).
Proposition 1 The parameter χ ∈ [0,1] can be interpreted as a general measure of
the quality of information on output or eﬀort, where χ =0coincides with veriﬁable
information and χ =1with non-observable information (this latter case applies only to
eﬀort since output is always observable by both transaction partners).
The proof of this proposition is derived from Table 1 by considering all information
modes involving non-veriﬁable information and setting χ equal to 0 and 1 respectively.
We ﬁr s tc o n s i d e rn o n - v e r i ﬁable information on eﬀort, starting with the information
mode {e,x} =( nv,nv) yielding a ﬁxed remuneration contract. Setting χ =0 , we
observe that this contract corresponds in all dimensions to the full insurance contract
for the information mode {e,x} =( v,nv). The other information mode involving non-
veriﬁable information on eﬀort is {e,x} =( nv,v), yielding a mixed piece rate contract.
At χ =0 , this contract yields the same outcomes as in {e,x} =( v,v), while at χ =1
the outcomes coincide with those if {e,x} =( no,v).
Now turn to the information mode with non veriﬁable information on output {e,x} =
(no,nv), yielding an implicit piece rate contract. At χ = 0, this contract produces the
same outcome as the explicit piece rate contract corresponding to the information mode
{e,x} =( no,v). ¤
The information modes of veriﬁability and non-observability can thus be viewed as
extreme cases of a general measure of information problems χ.V e r i ﬁable information
is the limiting case of ever declining veriﬁability problems (χ = 0); the trigger strat-
egy based on this information becomes as eﬀective in enforcing cooperation as a legal
contract veriﬁable in court. Non-observable information is the opposite extreme of ever
increasing veriﬁability problems (χ = 1). The trigger strategy that is conditioned on
the available information does not add any value. Intuitively, enforcement problems
increase with the discount rate δ (implying that the long-run gains from complying to18
non-veriﬁable obligations are discounted more heavily), or equivalently, with the length
of the transaction period (with a constant discount rate per period of time, a longer
transaction period corresponds to a larger discount rate per transaction period δ). A
longer transaction period implies that mutual obligations are cleared at a lower fre-
quency so that the buyer has to wait longer to observe the non-veriﬁable information.
The parameter χ can thus be viewed as summarizing the quality of non-veriﬁable infor-
mation. We shall therefore refer to the parameter χ as an inverse measure the quality
information: if χ = 0, the quality of information is perfect; if χ = 1, the quality of
information is so bad that it does not add any value.
The parameter χ can alternatively be interpreted as a parameter indicating how
serious the hold-up problem is in the relationship between buyer and seller. With
relationshipspeciﬁc output, eﬀort is a speciﬁc investment that gives rise to a hold-up
p r o b l e m : t h es u p p l i e rm u s ti n v e s te ﬀort before the output can be sold to the buyer
to whom the output is committed. The larger χ ≡ δ
1+δ and therefore the lower the
frequency at which mutual obligations are cleared, the more important is the investment
character of eﬀort and thus the more serious is the hold-up problem associated with this
speciﬁc investment is.
Proposition 2 If the quality of information on eﬀort is not inferior to that on output,
then information on output is irrelevant.
The only information mode in which the information on eﬀo r ti ss u p e r i o rt ot h a to n
output is {e,x} =( v,nv). This information mode yields the same outcome (i.e. a full
insurance contract) as the mode in which the information on output is upgraded to that
on eﬀort, namely {e,x} =( v,v).¤
The intuition for this proposition is that, in order for risk-neutral buyers to shield
risk-averse suppliers from production risk, the contractual payments should depend on
eﬀort rather than output. Hence, information on eﬀort is more valuable than information
on output so that contracts should employ information on output only if adequate
information on eﬀort is lacking.
Proposition 3 Supplier’s utility and eﬀort are strictly increasing in the quality of in-
formation on eﬀort. They are strictly increasing in the quality of information on output,
whenever this information is superior to the information on eﬀort.
The proof follows directly from Table 1 (by diﬀerentiating the entries for us in the
last three columns (corresponding to the implicit contracts) with respect to χ)a n d
Proposition 2.¤19
I n f o r m a t i o no ne ﬀort is always valuable to suppliers because it allows buyers to
insure suppliers at lower costs to the suppliers. Information on output is valuable only
if it provides superior information than the information on eﬀo r tt h a ti sa v a i l a b l e .T h e
better the quality of information becomes, the cheaper it is to provide incentives and
the higher the equilibrium level of eﬀort is.
Proposition 4 Buyer’s utility is positive if and only if the contract employs non-veriﬁable
information. In that case, it is hump shaped in the quality of information χ.
The proof follows directly from Table 1 by diﬀerentiating the entries for ud in the
last three columns (corresponding to the implicit contracts) with respect to χ.¤
Whenever a contract involves implicit incentive payments, y∗
n > 0, buyers should
extract rents from the continuation of the relationship in order to enforce their non-
veriﬁable obligations, see condition (10). The second part of the proposition implies
that buyers have an interest in an intermediate degree of non-veriﬁability. Only in
that case, buyers are able to obtain a signiﬁcant share of a substantial surplus. Too
much veriﬁability eliminates the reason for paying buyers rents and therefore reduces
the share of the surplus that accrues to buyers. Too little veriﬁability crowds out trade
by reducing the incentives for eﬀort and thus decreases the overall surplus from trade.
Beyond a certain degree of non-veriﬁability, the negative impact on the buyer’s pay oﬀ
of the smaller overall surplus dominates the positive impact of a larger surplus share.
The hump-shaped curve for the buyer’s utility resembles the Laﬀer curve for gov-
ernment tax revenues as a function of the tax rate. Indeed, if the information becomes
more non veriﬁable (as indicated by a larger parameter χ), the buyer has to impose a
larger implicit ’tax’ on suppliers in order to oﬀset his short-run gain from reneging on
the obligation to pay the incentive payments. This implicit tax can be viewed as the
price suppliers have to pay buyers to ensure that the buyers are committed to the con-
tract. Starting from a zero tax rate, the revenues from this implicit tax (i.e. the surplus
that accrues to buyers) ﬁrst increase with the level of the imposed tax but eventually
decrease as the adverse incentive eﬀects of higher implicit tax rates erode the base of
the tax.
Our analysis assumes that the quality of information is an exogenous variable. In
practice, however, agents may invest in the quality of information in order to alleviate
incentive problems so that the information quality becomes an endogenous variable.
The following proposition addresses the competitive value of information on eﬀort and
output.20
Proposition 5 The competitive value of information on eﬀort is strictly positive when-
ever the supplier is risk averse. The competitive value of information of output is strictly
positive whenever this information is superior to the information on eﬀort.
Competition forces rationed buyers to employ the quality of information that maxi-
mizes suppliers’ utility. Hence, the competitive value of additional information is deter-
mined by its eﬀect on us. The proof follows directly by diﬀerentiating the entries for us
in the last three columns (corresponding to the implicit contracts) with respect to χ. ¤
With risk-neutral suppliers, the quality of information on eﬀort is irrelevant whenever
veriﬁable information on output is available, as in the information mode {e,x} =( nv,v).
In that case, information on output crowds out the information on eﬀort. If eﬀort is
veriﬁable, better information on non-veriﬁable output does not generate any competitive
value, reﬂecting Proposition 2.
While proposition 5 investigated the competitive value of additional information,
we can also analyze the impact of additional information on overall welfare deﬁned as
the sum of us and ud.9 The competitive value of additional information is given by
its impact on only suppliers’ welfare. Accordingly, the diﬀerence between the welfare
impact of additional information and its competitive value is given by its eﬀect on the
utility of buyers. The last part of Proposition 4 indicates that, if information is poor (as
indicated by a high level of χ), investments in additional information generate positive
external eﬀects by increasing the rents accruing to buyers. If information is almost
veriﬁable (as reﬂected by a low level of χ), in contrast, additional information reduces
the pay-oﬀ of buyers so that additional information generates negative external eﬀects.
These negative external eﬀects are due to a business stealing eﬀect: in competing for
suppliers to trade with, buyers fail to take into account that they reduce the rents of
other buyers. This results in the following proposition:
Proposition 6 Whereas society underinvests in additional information if information
is poor, it overinvests in additional information if information is already of good quality.
The intuition behind this proposition is that additional information yields positive
external eﬀects if it generates substantial additional trade. If it mainly redistributes
rents away from buyers to sellers, in contrast, it yields adverse external eﬀects. This
latter eﬀect can be so strong that making output veriﬁable may even harm overall welfare
9This deﬁnition is natural since the marginal utility of income equals unity for both players. However,
since the external eﬀects involve buyers’ welfare only, our qualitative results go through as long as a
positive weight is attached to the welfare of the buyers.21
(as measured by the sum of the utilities of the supplier and buyer). In particular, Table
1 shows that moving from the information mode {e,x} =( nv,nv) to the information
mode {e,x} =( nv,v) by making output veriﬁable harms overall welfare if η(1 + η) >
(χ + η)2. Accordingly, if the information on eﬀort is reasonable good and risk aversion
is large, the introduction of veriﬁable information on output reduces welfare. This
is a typical second best result: improving information may harm welfare. Reﬂecting
proposition 5, the competitive value of veriﬁable information on output is positive.
The intuition for the diﬀerent signs of the competitive value and the welfare impact
of additional information is a business stealing eﬀect. In particular, competing buyers
invest in veriﬁable information on output to attract suppliers but in the process reduce
the rents accruing to other buyers.
4 Equilibrium without commitment
If the supplier is not committed to deliver the output to a speciﬁc buyer, he can sell
the output on the spot market. The buyer’s utility function implies that equilibrium
price level on the spot market is unity: y = x. With a normally distributed pay oﬀ,t h e
supplier sets eﬀort so as to maximize (3) subject to the constraint y = x. The resulting
equilibrium level of eﬀort e∗ = ε coincides with the ﬁrst-best level in a full insurance
contract under commitment. Trade in risk, however, is ineﬃcient. Since the risk-averse
supplier bears all the production risk, his utility in the spot market, us = 1
2 (1 − η), is
below that in the ﬁrst best (i.e. 1
2).
The following proposition states that the spot market is the only feasible equilibrium
in the case without commitment:
Proposition 7 Insurance is ruled out if suppliers cannot commit to a speciﬁcb u y e r .
The proof of this proposition applies an additional non-shirking condition. If suppli-
ers cannot commit to deliver all output to a speciﬁc buyer, this condition prevents the
supplier from selling (part of) the produced output on the spot market:











where xm denotes the output that is sold by the supplier on the spot market. By dividing




dx ≥ 1. The piece rate should always be greater or equal to the market22
price so that the non-contractible payment exhibit as least as much variation as output.
This rules out insurance.¤
Insurance demands some form of commitment from the supplier to transfer all output
to the buyer. Since the supplier is not rationed, he does not loose future rents by reneging
on this commitment. Hence, he has no incentives to comply. Anticipating this behavior,
the buyer does not oﬀer any insurance in the ﬁrst place. In the absence of commitment,
therefore, the spot market is the equilibrium outcome for all information modes so that
the quality of information is irrelevant for the outcome.
5 Equilibrium if suppliers can choose to commit
The previous two sections treated commitment and non-commitment of output as an
exogenous condition beyond the control of the supplier and the buyer. In practice,
the agents can invest in commitment. To illustrate, building a factory hall allows the
employer to prevent workers from selling the produced output to a third party on the
outside market. By enforcing the property rights of the buyer, a factory hall can thus
be viewed as an institutional device that allows suppliers to commit their output to
as p e c i ﬁc buyer. In some industries, a factory hall may not be needed to enforce this
commitment. In the case of consultancy and other professional services, for example, a
legal contract stipulating that employees are not allowed to provide services on their own
account may suﬃce. The visibility of these particular services makes such a contract
enforceable even though production does not occur in a factory hall. The commitment
to refrain from selling output on the outside market does not make the quality of the
output veriﬁable. It rules out only that suppliers obtain an alternative income from
their eﬀort by selling their output elsewhere but it does not necessarily imply that the
courts can verify the quantity of the produced output.
This discussion results in the following deﬁnition of a ﬁrm:
Deﬁnition 8 A ﬁrm is a physical or contractual arrangement between a supplier and
buyer that enforces the property rights of the buyer over all output of the eﬀort by the
supplier. A ﬁrm thus allows a supplier to commit to the delivery of all output of his
eﬀort to one speciﬁcb u y e r .
Appropriability of output by the buyer provides a more convincing rationale for the
existence of ﬁrms than reputations based on implicit contracts alone. Indeed, also many
transactions on the spot market are based on non-veriﬁable obligations supported by23
reputation. Hence, reputations do not require ﬁrms. Having deﬁned ﬁr m sa sd e v i c e st o
commit the delivery of output, we shall in the rest of this paper refer to the commitment
case as the ﬁrm. Likewise, having established that the spot market is the only feasible
outcome in the non-commitment case, we associate this case with the spot market. The
previous two sections thus discussed the outcomes for the ﬁrm and the spot market,
respectively. The comparison of these two cases allows us to explore whether the ﬁrm
survives competition from the spot market if suppliers can choose whether to commit
output or not. Competition forces rationed buyers to accept the appropriability mode
preferred by suppliers. Accordingly, in order to explore the competitiveness of the ﬁrm,
we compare suppliers’ utility in the ﬁrm (as contained in Table 1 for various information
modes) with that on the spot market (as discussed in Section 4).
Proposition 9 I nt h ep r e s e n c eo fs o m ev e r i ﬁable information and risk-averse suppliers,
the ﬁrm is always more competitive than the spot market.
The proof follows by comparing us for the modes featuring some form of veriﬁable
information in Table 1 (i.e. {e,x} =( v,v),(v,nv),(no,v),(nv,v)) with suppliers’ utility
1
2 (1 − η)i nt h es p o tm a r k e t . ¤
The intuition behind this proposition is that the ﬁrm allows a welfare improving
transfer of risk from the supplier to the buyer if information is veriﬁable. Some small
t r a n s f e ro fr i s ki sa l w a y se ﬃcient, even though this trade in risk harms the incentives for
eﬀort if only output is veriﬁable: a small amount of supplier insurance yields ﬁrst-order
welfare gains while the welfare losses on account of lower incentives are only second
order.
This proposition has important implications for the theory of the ﬁrm because it
implies that a ﬁrm using an explicit piece contract always dominates the spot market.
This limits the relevance of the standard principal agent model for exploring the bound-
aries of the ﬁrm vis-a-vis the spot market. In fact, spot markets can survive only under
one of three conditions:
• the enforcement of the delivery of output within a ﬁrm requires costly investments;
• writing an explicit contract is costly;
• both output and eﬀo r ta r en o tv e r i ﬁable.
The costly investments mentioned in the ﬁrst condition may involve building a fac-
tory hall. We return to these investments at the end of this section. The second24
condition is closely related to the third condition: an explicit contract is costly because
it requires resources to be invested in the veriﬁability of the information. Non veriﬁable
information (or costly veriﬁable information) thus is the key to understanding why spot
markets may be more competitive than ﬁrms are.
We now turn to the case in which veriﬁable information is absent.
Proposition 10 In the absence of any veriﬁable information and in the presence of risk-
averse suppliers, the ﬁrm is more competitive than the spot market if either suppliers
are suﬃciently risk averse or the non-veriﬁable information is of suﬃcient quality.
The proof follows from Table 1: suppliers’ utilities us in the information modes
{e,x} =( nv,nv), (no,nv) exceed suppliers’ utility 1
2 (1 − η)i nt h es p o tm a r k e ti fχ → 0
or η → 1.¤
In contrast to the case with explicit insurance contracts, the costs to the supplier
of implicit insurance contracts are ﬁrst order even if only small amounts of insurance
are provided. Indeed, these costs are related to the incentive payments (which must be
made credible by transferring rents to the buyer) rather than to the insurance provided.
Hence, the spot market is more competitive than the ﬁrm if risk aversion is small, so
that the costs to the supplier of the implicit contract outweigh the gains from insurance.
Intuitively, the price buyers charge to make incentive payments credible exceeds the
maximum insurance premium suppliers are willing to concede in order to be shielded
from spot market risk.10
Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) and MacLeod and Malcomson (1989) analyze the com-
mitment case with risk neutral suppliers and non veriﬁable eﬀort (and output). In that
setting, the relationshipspeciﬁc nature of output is exogenous and is problematic because
it gives rise to agency and hold up problems that can be addressed only through costly
implicit contracts associated with the underutilization of productive resources (either
unemployment or vacancies). Suppliers would be unambiguously better oﬀ if they could
get rid of their obligation to supply the output to the ﬁrm so that they could sell output
to the highest bidder. In this way, competition would eliminate the incentive problems,
thereby eliminating the underutilization of resources. Allowing for risk averse suppliers,
however, proposition 10 reveals that commitment within a ﬁrm is not necessarily less
10Even though it employs non veriﬁable information on eﬀort, the mixed piece rate contract (corre-
sponding to the information mode {e,x} =( nv,v)) always survives competition with the spot market
due to Proposition 9. With veriﬁable information on output, small amounts of insurance yield only
second-order losses in suppliers’ welfare even if the information on eﬀort is poor.25
desirable for suppliers than the spot market, even though information is non veriﬁable so
that explicit contracts can not address incentive problems associated with commitment.
Although the ﬁrm implies the absence of competition during the transaction period, it
may nevertheless be a blessing rather than a curse because it allows suppliers to insure
themselves. Competition between various modes of organizing production may thus in-
duce investments in the limitation of competition by making output relationshipspeciﬁc
within the ﬁrm.
Coase (1937) argued that the ﬁrm would emerge in equilibrium only if the spot
market suﬀers from substantial transaction cost. Our model, in contrast, implies that
the ﬁrm is more competitive than the spot market only if the ﬁrm does not suﬀer from
excessive contracting problems due to the low quality information on either eﬀort or
output. Thus, we reverse the Coasian perspective on the theory of the ﬁrm. The ﬁrm
survives the competition from the spot market only if workers (i.e. the suppliers) are
willing to pay a large enough insurance premium to the employer (i.e. the buyer) to
make the insurance contract credible. The value of the ﬁrm is equal to the discounted
value of these insurance premiums. It is this value that is traded on the stock market.
Our model thus explains why the stock market value of ﬁrms may substantially exceed
the tangible assets owned by these ﬁrms.
Figure 2 shows graphically how risk aversion and the quality of information impact
the competitiveness of the ﬁrm in the absence of veriﬁable information. The diagonal,
χ = η, represents the parameter combinations where suppliers are indiﬀerent between
the ﬁrm and the spot market for the information mode {e,x} =( nv,nv). To the north
west of this diagonal, the risk aversion parameter η exceeds the parameter indicating the
lack of veriﬁability of eﬀort, χ. In this area, the risk premium the suppliers are willing
to concede to be shielded from market risk exceeds the price they have to pay the ﬁrm
in order to make incentive payments credible. Hence, the ﬁrm is more competitive than
the spot market in this area.
The dotted curve, χ =
η2
1−η(1−η), represents the parameter combinations where sup-
pliers are indiﬀerent between the ﬁrm and the spot market for the information mode
{e,x} =( no,nv). Again, to the north west of the curve, the ﬁrm is more competitive
than the spot market. This area is smaller than the corresponding area for the infor-
mation mode {e,x} =( nv,nv). Intuitively, compared to the case in which it observes
also eﬀort, the ﬁrm can oﬀer the worker less insurance for the same costly incentive
payments. With insurance thus becoming more expensive, the supplier ﬁnds the ﬁrm
less attractive compared to the spot market.26
The following proposition characterizes the loci for which the ﬁrm and the spot
market are equally competitive:
Proposition 11 In the absence of veriﬁable information, the utility of the buyer, the
equilibrium level of eﬀort and the allocation of risk are discontinuous at the point where
the ﬁrm and the spot market are equally competitive. In particular, in the spot market
the utility of the buyer is lower, while eﬀort and the risk borne by the supplier are higher.
The proof follows by comparing the equilibrium outcomes for the spot market with
those for the information modes {e,x} =( nv,nv), (no,nv) in Table 1 at the parameter
combinations of η and χ where suppliers’ utility 1
2 (1 − η) in the spot market equals
suppliers’ utility under the two information modes in Table 1.¤
A tt h ep o i n tw h e r et h eﬁrm is as competitive as the spot market, the level of the
buyer’s utility is discontinuous. This is closely related to Proposition 4: whereas the
buyer obtains his outside option on the spot market, a contract relying on non veriﬁable
information is credible only if the buyer enjoys a surplus. Hence, moving from the ﬁrm to
the spot market, the buyer experiences a drop in utility. Suppliers’ utility, in contrast,
remains constant, but its composition changes discontinuously. In particular, higher
expected monetary incomes compensate for a loss in insurance as suppliers no longer
have to transfer part of the surplus to the buyer to make the ﬁrm’s incentive payments
credible. Without these costs (to the supplier) of providing incentive payments, eﬀort
jumps upward to its ﬁrst best level; compared to the provision of additional eﬀort within
a ﬁrm, the provision of additional eﬀort is less costly to the supplier because it does
not require the supplier to transfer more surplus to the buyer. The costs of implicit
incentive payments explains why eﬀort in the ﬁrm cannot exceed that in the market.
These discrete regime switches oﬀers an explanation for the observation by Krueger(1991)
that two rather diﬀerent transaction modes coexist in the fast food industry, namely
low powered incentive schemes with a ﬁxed hourly wage (i.e. the ﬁxed remuneration
contract) and high powered incentive scheme where the owner of a franchise absorbs all
the establishment speciﬁc risk (i.e. the spot market). Apparently, this industry operates
around the point at which an implicit insurance contract is about as competitive as the
spot market. Our model conﬁrms the popular judgments about ﬁxed remuneration con-
tracts versus franchises: ﬁxed remuneration contracts provide less incentives but more
insurance than franchises do. Hence, workers provide more eﬀort in franchises.
The introduction of a ﬁrm to enforce the property rights of the buyer on the out-
put may require costly investments in the organization of production, for example the27
construction of a factory hall. Comparing suppliers’ utilities for the ﬁrm and the spot
market, one can compute the competitive value of such investments.
Proposition 12 The competitive value of investments in a ﬁrm is non decreasing in
risk aversion and the quality of information.
Compute the diﬀerence between us in Table 1 (for various information modes) and
suppliers’ utility without commitment (i.e.1
2(1−η)) and deﬁne ˆ us ≡ max{ us−1
2(1−η),0}
as the utility gain from the option to create a ﬁrm. Taking the ﬁrst derivative of ˆ us with
respect to η and χ, one ﬁnds δˆ us
δη ≥ 0a n dδˆ us
δχ ≥ 0.¤
The intuition behind this proposition is that the beneﬁts of a ﬁrm rise with risk
aversion while the costs of a ﬁrm decline with quality of information. In particular,
i n v e s t m e n t si nc o m m i t m e n tw i t h i naﬁrm allow insurance and are thus especially valu-
able if suppliers are risk averse. Moreover, the incentive problems associated with this
commitment become less serious if better information allows for better contracts. In-
vestments in the quality of information and commitment are thus complements: better
information makes the ﬁrm more attractive (see Proposition 3) while commitment within
a ﬁrm makes good information important so that contracts can alleviate incentive prob-
lems within substantial transaction costs.
6 Outside option: no trade
The previous section showed that insurance harms eﬀort. This result may no longer hold
if suppliers can opt for a third alternative in addition to the ﬁrm and spot market, namely
a riskless outside option of enjoying leisure so that neither production nor trade occur
(i.e. xt = yt = 0). The utility value of leisure amounts to 1
2β,0 ≤ β ≤ 1.11 The model is
thus fully parameterized by the quality of the outside option β, the degree of risk aversion
η, the information modes on eﬀort and output, and the length of the transaction period
as indicated by χ. Figure 3 graphically compares the competitiveness of the various
transaction modes. The various indiﬀerence lines depict, for each information mode
(and assuming a particular value for χ), the combinations of β and η for which the
supplier is indiﬀerent between, on the one hand, the ﬁrm, and, on the other hand, either
11There is a diﬀerence between engaging in production and supplying no eﬀort (i.e. et =0 )a n d
taking advantage of the outside option. If working at et = 0, the risk-averse supplier is still subject
to production risk zt. If enjoying leisure, in contrast, the supplier collects a risk free payoﬀ 1
2β.T h e
choice to enjoy leisure is assumed to be veriﬁable.28
the spot market or no trade. In addition, the broken 45o degree line MN (η =1− β)
divides the plane into an area below the diagonal where the spot market dominates no
trade and an area above the diagonal where no trade dominates the spot market.
For the four information modes involving veriﬁable information, the ﬁrm always
dominates the spot market, see Proposition 9. Hence, only the indiﬀerence loci between
the ﬁrm and no trade are relevant. The ﬁrm dominates no trade in the area to the south-
west of the loci. The areas are larger than the area where the spot market dominates
no trade, consistent with the observation that the ﬁrm dominates the spot market for
these information modes. The vertical line MP (β =1 )r e p r e s e n t st h ei n d i ﬀerence locus
for the information modes {e,x} =( v,v),(v,nv). Since full insurance is ﬁrst best, this
information mode yields the largest area in which production dominates no trade. MS
(η =
1−β
β ) depicts the locus for the information mode {e,x} =( no,v), which yields an
explicit piece rate contract. The area to the south west of this curve is the smallest of
all veriﬁable information modes since it yields the lowest utility for the worker. The
indiﬀerence curve MQ (η =
(1−β)χ
β−(1−χ)), which corresponds to {e,x} =( nv,v), lays in
between MP and MS.
In the two information modes employing only non-veriﬁable information, the ﬁrm
is subject to competition not only from the east (no trade), but also from the south
(the spot market). The square in the north west delineated by the lines VR (β =
1 − χ)a n dVX (η = χ) represents the area where the ﬁrm is the most competitive for
the information mode {e,x} =( nv,nv), yielding a ﬁxed remuneration contract. VR
and VX are the loci of indiﬀerence of the ﬁrm with no trade and the spot market,
respectively. The parameter space is thus divided into three parts corresponding to
production within the ﬁrm (the square NRVX), production for the spot market (the
area VMOX), and the absence of any trade (the area RPMV ). In the area RNV,
production would not occur without ﬁrms facilitating insurance. The insurance provided
by the ﬁrm encourages suppliers to deliver eﬀort in a risky environment. In this way,
the invention of the ﬁrm has stimulated production. Hence, contrary to the conclusion
of the previous section which compared the ﬁrm to the spot market only, the ﬁrm might
actually raise eﬀort.12 If quality of information improves (and thus χ declines), the area
RNV where the ﬁrm enhances trade becomes larger.
If only output is observable (i.e. {e,x} =( no,nv)), the area where the ﬁrm is most
12Assuming that production risk increases with eﬀort, Sinn (1995) argues that insurance may enhance
incentives. We arrive at similar conclusions as Sinn (1995) in a model in which production risk does
not rise with the level of eﬀort.29
competitive, NTWY, is smaller compared the case in which also eﬀort is observable.
This is because non-veriﬁable information on output allows the ﬁrm to oﬀer less insur-
ance than non-veriﬁable information on eﬀort. Nevertheless, also under this information
mode, the ﬁrm opens up the possibility of production in the area NTW, where otherwise
suppliers would prefer not to produce at all.
Whereas proposition 11 investigates the loci of indiﬀerence of the ﬁrm with the spot
market, the following proposition analyzes the loci of indiﬀerence of the ﬁrm with no
trade.
Proposition 13 If the contract operated by the ﬁrm employs non-veriﬁable information,
the utility of the buyer is discontinuous at the point where the supplier is indiﬀerent
between the ﬁrm and no trade, being larger for the ﬁrm.
The proof is similar to that of Proposition 11. ¤
Propositions 11 and 13 can be used to explore the welfare implications of competition
between the spot market, no trade and the ﬁrm.
Proposition 14 If the contract operated by the ﬁrm employs non-veriﬁable informa-
tion, competition between the ﬁrm, the spot market, and no trade may harm welfare by
crowding out the ﬁrm.
This proposition is a direct implication of the discontinuity of ud and the continuity
of us at the loci of indiﬀerence between the ﬁrm and the spot market (see Proposition
11) and between the ﬁrm and no trade (see Proposition 13). As the ﬁrm is replaced by
the spot market or no trade, the drop in buyer’s utility is ﬁrst order while the change
in supplier’s utility is only second order. ¤
Giving the supplier the option to sell output on the spot market may involve costs.
Proposition 14 suggests that society may overinvest in this option. The proposition
is illustrated by considering the information mode {e,x} =( nv,nv). As discussed in
Section 5, suppliers are indiﬀerent between the ﬁrm and the spot market for χ = η.
If χ marginally exceeds η, the supplier prefers the spot market above the ﬁrm, while
the utility of the buyer jumps discontinuously from a positive value under the ﬁrm to
zero in the spot market. Competition between the various transaction modes implies
that the spot market crowds out the ﬁrm even though the latter yields higher overall
welfare. This is because suppliers do not take into account the negative externality on
buyers’ rents of their decision to quit the ﬁrm and switch to the spot market. Whereas
the utility gain for suppliers is only second order, the loss in rents accruing to the ﬁrm
is ﬁrst order.30
7 Conclusions
We established a theory of the ﬁrm based on the imperfect ability of risk-averse suppliers
to commit to an insurance contract in which they promise to deliver all output to
the buyer. The ﬁrm is viewed as a device enabling the supplier to commit to this
delivery, either by physical means, such as a factory hall, or by contractual means,
as in case of consultancy ﬁrms. This commitment device introduces speciﬁcity in the
relation between the supplier and the buyer. Rather than some exogenous technological
requirement, speciﬁcity is thus deliberately introduced to make insurance feasible. In
addition to the classical trade oﬀ between insurance and incentives popularized by the
standard principal agent model, our model features a second trade oﬀ,n a m e l yt h a t
between insurance and surplus sharing. Implicit insurance contracts can be operated
only if risk-averse suppliers concede part of the surplus to buyers. In the worst case,
in which eﬀort is non-observable and — unlike in the principal agent model — output
is not veriﬁable, incentives are dulled for two reasons, namely to reduce both the risk
assumed by risk-averse suppliers and the surplus that must be conceded to the buyer.
Interestingly, we established that non-veriﬁability of information can be viewed as an
intermediate case between non-observability and veriﬁability, see Proposition 1.
Our analysis uncovered a fundamental diﬀerence between the ”principal-agent” trade
oﬀ between insurance and incentives and the ”non-veriﬁability” trade oﬀ between insur-
ance and surplus sharing. The cost to the supplier of a small amount of insurance is only
second order in the principal agent model, whereas it is ﬁrst order in the non-veriﬁability
model. As a direct consequence, explicit insurance contracts based on veriﬁable infor-
mation always dominate the spot market, see Proposition 9. Indeed, the spot market
can dominate the ﬁrm only if information is non-veriﬁable, the commitment device is
costly, or explicit contracts are associated with transaction costs. The transition from
the spot market to a ﬁrm based implicit contract, in contrast, is discontinuous, see
Proposition 11. Whereas the aggregate pay oﬀ of the supplier moves continuously, its
composition changes discontinuously. Incentives and hence eﬀort fall, while insurance
jumps up, conﬁrming the popular judgment regarding the implications of ﬁrm based
employment relations versus self employment. The overall pay oﬀ of the buyer jumps
up when moving from the spot market to the implicit contract. This regime switch
makes the lack of veriﬁability model more suitable for analyzing the nature of the ﬁrm
vis-a-vis the market than the principal agent model.
In the principal agent model, the contract formulated by transaction partners max-31
imizes wealth conditional on the incentive constraint of the supplier. In the non-
veriﬁability model, in contrast, this is not generally the case. The reason is that com-
petition between buyers implies that the equilibrium contract maximizes the suppliers’
pay oﬀ. Competition thus disregards external eﬀects on the buyers’ pay oﬀ,n a m e l yt h e
surplus collected by buyers when employing an implicit contract. Accordingly, compe-
tition between the spot market and a ﬁrm using implicit contracts may crowd out the
ﬁrm on account of a business stealing eﬀect, thereby hampering wealth maximization,
see Proposition 14.
We have taken the quality of information as exogenous. In reality, agents may invest
in the quality of information so that the available information becomes endogenous. Our
model can be fruitfully employed to analyze both the competitive and social value of such
investments. When doing so, we encounter the same mechanism as in investigating the
welfare implications of competition between the spot market and the ﬁrm. In particular,
the competitive value of information accounts only for the eﬀect of improved information
on supplier’s utility, while the social value of information includes also the impact on
the buyer’s pay oﬀ. The latter pay oﬀ can be viewed as resulting from an implicit ”tax”
imposed on the supplier by the buyer to make the latter’s commitment to the insurance
contract credible. Just as other, explicit tax revenues, the implicit tax revenues collected
by the buyer exhibit the shape of a Laﬀer curve. In particular, for a small implicit tax
associated with small veriﬁability problems, a marginal increase in the tax rate corre-
sponding to a small increase in veriﬁability problems raises the revenues accruing to the
buyer. Beyond a certain point, however, the veriﬁability problems become so grave that
the adverse incentive eﬀects of a higher tax rate on the tax base dominate the positive
revenue eﬀects of a further increase in the tax rate, see Proposition 4. Since suppliers
ignore these eﬀects on the rents (i.e. tax revenues) collected by buyers and since the
actual contract maximizes suppliers utility due to competition between buyers, society
underinvest in information if the initial information is poor. If information is good to
start with, in contrast, too many resources are spend on enhancing the quality of infor-
mation further, see Proposition 6. Intuitively, suppliers improve information to avoid
having to pay implicit taxes. Hence, additional information redistributes rents instead
of creating additional value for society at large. The overall welfare eﬀect of more jurid-
iﬁcation (i.e. more explicit contracting based on better, namely veriﬁable, information
replacing implicit contracts based on long-term relationships) is therefore ambiguous: it
may either create value by facilitating trade or destroy value by using scarce resources
to redistribute rents. The latter eﬀect most likely dominates if most potential trade has32
already been exploited by implicit contracts based on good information.
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Appendix The derivation of contracts
8.0.1 Mode {e,x} =( v,v)
Competition between inﬁnitely elastic buyers ensures that the buyers’ participation
constraint (use (5)) ud = 1
εE[e − y] ≥ 0 is binding so that E[y]= E [ e]=e. Optimizing
expression (3) with respect to e∗ subject to the participation constraint E[y]=e∗,w e
arrive at e∗ = ε.¤
8.0.2 Mode {e,x} =( no,v)
This information mode is assumed in the standard principal agent model. Holmstrom
and Milgrom (1987) show that the optimal contract in this case is linear in output:
y = a+bx.13 Accordingly, the pay oﬀ of suppliers rs is distributed normally. Substituting
y = a+bx into (3) and maximizing the resulting expression with respect to e, we arrive
at e = bε. The participation constraint of the buyer is binding due to competition
between buyers, ud = 1
εE[e − y] = 0. This implies that a =( 1− b)e =( 1− b)bε and
y = e + bz = b(ε + z). Substituting this expression for y and e = bε into equation (3)
to eliminate y and e and maximizing the resulting expression with respect to b,w eﬁnd
b∗ = 1
1+η and e∗ = ε
1+η.¤
8.0.3 Mode {e,x} =( nv,nv)
Since neither eﬀort nor output is veriﬁable, the contractible payment yc has to be con-
stant. A supplier who shirks on his non-veriﬁable obligations thus lacks incentives to










13Whereas Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) assume that suppliers learn about the state of nature
during the course of the transaction period, we assume that suppliers know the state of nature already at
the beginning of the transaction period. However, suppliers cannot exploit this additional information
b e c a u s et h es t a t eo fn a t u r ed o e sn o ta ﬀect the optimal eﬀort level under a linear contract. Hence,
suppliers select exactly the same eﬀort level as under the Holmstrom and Milgrom assumption.34























Competition between buyers makes this constraint binding for all z,s ot h a te∗ and
therefore y∗
n do not depend on z.S i n c ee∗,y c, and y∗































Competition between buyers ensures that the equilibrium contract maximizes us with
respect to e∗. This results in e∗ =( 1− χ)ε.¤
8.0.4 Mode {e,x} =( no,nv)
We consider a truncated implicit linear contract yn = a+b¯ x,w h e r e¯ x ≡ max[x+,min[x,x−]].
Hence, the minimum and maximum bonus are given by, respectively, minz [yn]=a+bx−
and maxz [yn]=a + bx+.D e ﬁne: z+,− ≡ x+,− − εb. The non-negativity constraint on
yn implies:
yn ≥ a + bx
− ≥ 0
Competition between buyers makes this constraint binding so that a = −bz− − εb2.
Consider a supplier who decides on eﬀort e facing this contract. If the decision is
unaﬀected by the non-linearities in the contract, the optimal level is e∗ = εb. Whenever




supplier is better oﬀ by not providing any eﬀort. Let z0 denote the value of z for which
this inequality is just satisﬁed, z0 ≡ z− + 1
2εb. For any z<z 0, the supplier provides no
eﬀort (i.e. e =0 )b e c a u s et h ee ﬀort cost dominates the non-veriﬁable bonus. Likewise,
yn can never be larger then a + bx+.H e n c e ,w h e n e v e rz+ <z<z + + εb, the supplier
sets eﬀort below εb so that yn is exactly equal to its maximum: e = εb − (z − z+). For
z++εb ≤ z, the supplier optimally provides no eﬀort, e = 0, since negative eﬀort would
be costly. Hence:35
ze x y n
(−∞,z0]0 z 0
(z0,z+] εb εb + z 1
2εb2 + b(z − z0)
(z+,zˆ] εb − (z − z+) εb + z+ 1
2εb2 + b(z+ − z0)
(zˆ,∞)0 z 1
2εb2 + b(z+ − z0)



































where φ[.]a n dΦ[.] are the normal density and distribution function and φ
i and Φi
denote φ[zi]a n dΦ[zi] for i = −,0,+,ˆ . For the derivation of the expression for yn[0],
we use z0 < 0 <z +.14












(E[x] − E[yn] − yc) (18)
The utility of suppliers can be written as:
εu

















































and ~ φ ≡ φ[z]. 1
2θ
2b2 exp[Ψ] is the expected value of the exponent of a truncated trans-








,w eh a v eΨ[−∞,∞,.]=1 .T h et e r m
Q reﬂects the utility gain obtained by spending less eﬀort when z is above the upper
threshold. Using expression (10) to eliminate yc from (19), we arrive at:
εu
























14The solutions of the ﬁrst-order conditions for z0 and z+ derived below for lim
ε→∞ are of the form
¡
z0,+¢2 =constant, see equation (21). These equations have a positive and a negative root. Hence, the
sign of z0 is determined by the second-order condition. Intuitively, the optimal contract subjects to
the piece rate the part of the support of z that features the highest density, i.e. the area around the
median z =0 .36



















































The optimal truncated linear contract maximizes us. Hence, the following ﬁrst order














































































. Let the functions z0 [ε]a n dz+[ε]d e n o t et h ev a l u e so fz0 and











which follows from multiplying both ﬁrst-order conditions by ε and dropping the van-
ishing terms (using lim
z→∞
zφ(z)=0 ) .E m p l o y i n gt h ed e ﬁnition of φ(z), we ﬁnd from (21)





















Due to competition, this inequality is binding. The value of b that maximizes lim
ε→∞
us
thus satisﬁes b =
1−χ
1+(1−χ)η.¤
8.0.5 Mode {e,x} =( nv,v)
The explicit contract is linear in output yc = a+bx.15 This explicit contract applies also
if the supplier shirks on his non-veriﬁable obligations contained in the implicit contract.
15Like in the mode {e,x} =( no,nv)), we cannot prove that the linear form of the contract is optimal.37
Hence, if shirking on his non-veriﬁable obligations, the supplier selects eﬀort so as to
maximize (substitute y = a + bx into (3) to eliminate y) εus = a + be − θ
2b2 − 1
2εe2.
This yields esh = bε. Substituting this expression and yc = a + bx into the supplier’s















































Competition between buyers makes this constraint binding for all z,s ot h a te∗ and
therefore y∗
n do not depend on z.S i n c ee∗and y∗
n are thus non-stochastic and the linearity
of the explicit contract implies that y∗
c is distributed normally with Var[y∗























































Competition between buyers ensures that the equilibrium contract maximizes us with
respect to the implicitly agreed eﬀort level e∗ and explicit piece rate b. This yields
b =
χ







Table 1: Summary of various transaction modes
{e,x} (v,v)(v,nv)( no,v)( nv,nv)( no,nv)( nv,v)

















































1+η 1 − χ
1−χ






















fi : full insurance, epr : explicit piece rate, fr : ﬁxed remuneration, ipr : implicit piece rate,
mpr : mixed piece rate, b : the piece rate
16This column assumes ε →∞and η = θ/ε is constant.394041